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Key features of the new EU strategy: 
Interests, approaches and selected areas 
for cooperation 
The German Presidency of the EU in the first half 
of 2007 inspired great hopes regarding the 
development of relations between the European 
Union and the states of Central Asia. In Brussels 
and other European capitals, it was expected that 
Germany, as an EU political and economic 
heavyweight and one of the key promoters of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, would be 
able to foster a coordinated Central Asian policy 
giving direction and coherence to European 
engagement in the region. It was widely hoped – 
within both the governments of Central Asia and the 
societies of the region – that Germany, which has 
traditionally been the most pro-active European 
country in the region, would elevate the relations 
between the EU and Central Asian states to a higher 
level.
1  
At the end of the German Presidency, in June 2007, 
the EU adopted “The EU and Central Asia: Strategy 
for a New Partnership”.
2 It was the first-ever EU 
strategy developed for Central Asia, and in this way, 
it marked a real breakthrough in the relations 
between European and Central Asian countries. In 
this document an attempt is made to go beyond the 
assistance programme with generic developmental 
goals based on the perceived needs of the region, to 
define European interests in the region, find 
prospective areas for cooperation and improve the 
approaches by making them more effective.  
                                                 
1 Germany is the only European country to maintain an 
embassy in all five Central Asian states. 
2 Council of the European Union (2007), The EU and 
Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, Document 
10113/07, Brussels, 31 May (endorsed by the EU Council 
Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European 
Council, 21-22 June 2007). 
The Strategy indicates that the EU is interested in “a 
peaceful, democratic and economically prosperous 
Central Asia”. The transformation of the region in 
this direction is to alleviate the present and potential 
negative impact of developments in Central Asia 
and its even-more problematic southern 
neighbourhood on European security. Central Asian 
security became more important for Europe in view 
of the EU enlargement that brought the region closer 
to European borders, and therefore made the 
potential of the impact stronger.  
The EU approach to security within the Strategy is 
comprehensive. It will continue to provide direct 
assistance to the security sector: helping to combat 
human, drugs and arms trafficking, proliferation, 
organised crime and international terrorism. It will 
also help to address the causes of instability, such as 
poor governance, lack of rule of law, poverty and 
violation of human rights, through various aid 
programmes.   
Another EU interest in the region lies in the energy 
sphere. European countries would like to have 
access to Central Asia oil and gas resources, and the 
region’s aim is to diversify trade partners and supply 
routes. The EU member states and the countries of 
Central Asia share an ambition to reduce their 
dependence on Russian supplies and pipelines. 
Therefore, the EU and Central Asian partners have 
complementary energy security needs and interests. 
By articulating its interests in Central Asia, the EU 
creates a more solid base for EU policy in the 
region. From the point of view of Central Asia, the 
adoption of the Strategy is also a positive 
development. It signals that the EU recognises that 
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it has certain interests in the region and that the 
Union’s engagement is long-term. With Central 
Asia the adoption of the Strategy strengthens the 
perception of the EU as a political and even strategic 
actor in the region with its own agenda, supported 
by significant resources.  
As for changing approaches, the Strategy envisages 
an intensification of political ties (regular dialogue 
on a variety of topics with top officials), more 
assistance (double the amount/budget for the period 
of 2007-13) and a strong focus on bilateral relations. 
The previous assistance programme was criticised 
for excessive emphasis on the regional approach that 
proved largely ineffective in the circumstances of 
Central Asia.
3 In the Strategy it was decided to 
maintain a regional approach for issues that need 
regional solutions (organised crime, drugs 
trafficking, water management, etc.) and to develop 
more tailored policies and cooperation programmes 
to deal with issues better solved on a bilateral basis, 
taking into account different needs and conditions in 
Central Asian states. These developments can only 
be welcomed, for they indicate more engagement, 
more resources and more attention to specificities 
and pragmatic ways of interacting with Central 
Asia.   
While the articulated interests and improved 
approaches to the region are very important, the core 
(real ‘meat’) of the Strategy is the section that 
specifies a number of areas for “a strengthened EU 
approach”. It shows what areas the EU is planning 
to focus on in order to promote its interests. These 
areas can be sub-divided into two groups. The first 
consists of areas that are fairly straightforward and 
imply a clear action plan with easily identifiable 
objectives and activities.  
One such area is headed ‘Investing in the future: 
Youth and education’. It is a very promising and 
forward-looking policy aimed at bringing up a new 
generation of Central Asians that would be more 
familiar with and attuned to European values and 
norms. The Strategy envisions the launch of the 
European Education Initiative for Central Asia to 
assist “the adaptation of the education systems of 
Central Asian states to the needs of the globalised 
world”, and support at all levels of education, from 
primary to higher. Europe has a lot to offer in this 
respect, and the will of European countries to help is 
met by the desire of Central Asians to study in 
Europe or according to European standards.  
Another unproblematic area is the ‘Promotion of 
economic development, trade and investment’. The 
                                                 
3 International Crisis Group (2006), Central Asia: What 
Role for the European Union?, Asia Report 113, 10 April 
(http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4065).  
accession of Central Asian states to the WTO, 
encouraging exports and economic diversification to 
be promoted by the EU are objectives that coincide 
with the agendas of Central Asian governments. The 
same can be said about the Environmental Stability 
and Water subsection. Considering the poor level of 
environmental policies in the region, to achieve the 
goals will not be easy. However, the spirit of 
partnership between Europeans and Central Asians 
can be strong, since the cooperation is in the 
interests of Central Asian states.  
‘Combating common threats and challenges’ can 
also be placed in the first category, albeit with some 
reservations. European assistance in border 
management, fighting regional criminal activity and 
international drug trade has been and will be 
appreciated by Central Asian governments. The 
Border Management Programme for Central Asia 
(BOMCA), considered one of the most successful 
European projects in the region, is to broaden its 
activities.  
Difficulties might arise from differences in how 
Europe and Central Asian counterparts approach the 
problem of security. The understanding of security 
in Central Asia is strongly state-centred and 
determined by the logic of authoritarianism; 
political dissident is considered as a security 
challenge.
4. The opposite assessments of the 
Andijan events given by European and Central 
Asian governments (supported by Russia and China) 
illustrate this point.
5 Since the EU is not a guarantor 
of security in the region, however it will not have to 
face major dilemmas in this regard.  
The second group consists of areas of European 
action that do not have clear-cut solutions, that are 
subject to difficult dilemmas and where full-fledged 
cooperation of Central Asian partners is not 
guaranteed due to various reasons. One such area is 
Human rights, rule of law, good governance and 
democratisation, which that is outlined at the outset 
of the Strategy. It arises from the interest of the EU 
in a ‘democratic and prosperous’ Central Asia. In 
the Strategy the EU commits itself to launching a 
                                                 
4 For an in-depth discussion of differences between 
European and Central Asian approaches to security, see 
Daniel Kimmage (2007), Security Challenges in Central 
Asia. Implications for the EU’s Engagement Strategy, 
CEPS Policy Brief No. 139, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, July. 
5 On 13 May 2005, the Uzbek government used 
indiscriminate violence to suppress unrest in the city of 
Andijan located in the Ferghana Valley. As a result, 
several hundred people died. While the EU and the US 
demanded an independent investigation of the events, 
Russia, China and other Central Asian states supported 
the actions of the Uzbek government.   
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Rule of Law initiative, conducting training for 
regional legal experts and holding a regular dialogue 
on human rights with the government of the region, 
and other activities to promote good governance in 
Central Asia. The problem with this area is that the 
EU does not have enough leverage with the 
governments of Central Asian states, for the 
European ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ are not that big. The 
strategy introduces a sentence on conditionality for 
EU engagement, noting that the intensity of 
cooperation will reflect the commitment to 
transition and reform in each country. However, this 
can work only with the states that are strongly 
interested in strengthening ties with Europe for 
geopolitical or other reasons.  
European countries have already faced difficult 
choices with regard to their Central Asian partners. 
They had to decide how to react in cases of heavy 
violations of human rights (the Andijan massacre 
being the extreme case), what to do in respect to 
other instances of the violation of rights and how to 
assess largely fraudulent elections. It is clear that 
more uneasy choices are in store. It is likely that two 
dilemmas will remain central for the EU in Central 
Asia: how to balance the liberal goals of the 
promotion of democracy and human rights and 
realist interests of securing access to the region’s 
energy reserves, and how to engage and not to ‘lose’ 
the region without becoming too soft on local 
authoritarian regimes. 
Another area that implies making difficult choices is 
“strengthening energy and transport links”. 
Diversification of European energy supply means 
the development of infrastructure to bring Central 
Asian oil and gas to European consumers bypassing 
Russia. It is in the interests of both Europe and 
Central Asia, but European projects in the region 
have very slim chances of being realised as Russia 
is strongly opposed to them. Central Asian states are 
vulnerable to Russian pressures and so are European 
energy companies that have valuable assets in 
Russia. As noted by many experts, Moscow has 
been very successful in playing the energy card and 
dividing the European countries.
6 It is also 
important to keep in mind the third competitor for 
Central Asian resources – China, whose influence in 
the region has been consistently growing. If the EU 
is to make progress in this area, it will need to pool 
its resources and determine routes and arrangements 
that most closely comply most with its interests.   
                                                 
6 For the latest overview of Russian policies, see Marc 
Leonard and Nicu Popescu, (2007), “A Power Audit of 
EU-Russia Relations”, European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2 November (http://ecfr.eu/page/-
/documents/ECFR-EU-Russia-power-audit.pdf). 
For the EU to answer these questions, it will need to 
address a number of serious geopolitical challenges: 
How to build a relationship with an increasingly 
assertive Russia and how to enhance European 
energy security without antagonising Russia? 
Whether to engage in Central Asia with the aim of 
seeking to become a strategic actor in the area, 
thereby significantly shaping local developments or 
whether to let the region slip under the traditional 
Russian control and new Chinese supervision. In 
this regard, the EU strategy is unusual for it does not 
dwell on the geo-political context. Russia and China 
are not mentioned once.  
Why does Central Asia need greater EU 
engagement? 
Most of 20
th century Central Asia endured the 
domination of Russia. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Central Asian states found themselves 
on their own and in a complex geopolitical 
environment. They could go back to their roots and 
establish ties with Muslim states, become members 
of their organisations, and in this way rejoin the 
Islamic world; they could follow Russia in 
integrating with the Euro-Atlantic community; and 
they could start cooperation with neighbouring 
China. In the end, all of these courses were followed 
by governments of the region in the form of their 
‘multi-vector’ foreign policies. This balancing act 
worked for a decade, but it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to sustain due to the new assertiveness of 
Russia which wishes to strengthen its positions in 
the ‘near abroad’, a development that is coinciding 
with the growth of Chinese influence in the region. 
Both Russia and China are interested in squeezing 
out the West from the area.  At the same time, the 
engagement of the US and Europe has also been on 
the rise. 
The four actors with the strongest capacity to 
influence the developments in the region are Russia, 
China, the US and the EU. If the interests of the 
region are considered in a comprehensive manner, 
from the point of view of the costs and benefits of 
cooperation with each of these powers, then the EU 
would come at the top of the list.  
Russia is the traditional patron that Central Asians 
are used to and feel relatively comfortable with. It 
has an array of tools to use in order to maintain 
influence in the region (security guarantees, cheap 
arms, economic projects and investments, etc.). 
However, at present Russia cannot offer Central 
Asia real solutions to the problems of the region 
(poverty, poor governance and potential instability). 
It does not have enough resources, but more 
importantly, it does not provide a good example of 
how to deal with these problems. Besides, there are  
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concerns about the Russia’s ‘big brother’ complex 
that makes it psychologically difficult for Central 
Asians to give up the ‘multi-vector’ diplomacy.   
China is politically and economically more 
successful than Russia. It is also able and willing to 
contribute to security and to the development of the 
region. However, further integration with China is 
even more problematic than that with Russia. 
Firstly, China cannot offer appropriate models for 
the transformation of Central Asian states into well-
functioning polities because its current Communist 
party-controlled system is a political ‘yesterday’ for 
post-Soviet republics. Indeed, the Chinese 
government is in the process of experimentation 
itself and it is not clear how the political system of 
this country will evolve. Secondly, integration with 
China is problematic from the   psychological 
perspective. There are already considerable fears of 
Chinese economic expansion and migration into the 
region, particularly in Kazakhstan, where the influx 
of Chinese migrants has been the largest due to 
economic opportunities in this republic. Unlike 
Russia, China is perceived as ‘the other’, a very 
different civilization threatening the local identity.
7 
Similar to Russia, in Central Asia the Chinese 
immigration is often discussed in terms of ‘slow 
infiltration’ and ‘taking over the territories.’
8   
Ensuring the long-term security and prosperity of 
Central Asia are impossible without political 
reforms, and neither Russia nor China is interested 
in the democratisation of the region. Instead they 
have legitimised fraudulent elections and generally 
act to shelter Central Asian governments from 
international criticism of their repressive policies. 
Russia and China position themselves as leading 
security-providers for Central Asia through the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). 
However, their narrow approach to security can 
render their engagement in these issues 
                                                 
7 The attitudes of the general public are reflected in the 
results of the Asia Barometer Survey 2005. 25.5% of 
Kazakh respondents, 30.5% of Kyrgyz respondents and 
21.9% of Uzbek respondents assessed the influence of 
China on their country as bad or rather bad, The attitude 
of Tajik respondents was more positive, only 8.6% of 
respondents said that the influence of China is bad.  This 
contrasts with the perception of Russia by Central Asians 
– 2% of Kazakh respondents, 0.8% of Kyrgyz 
respondents, 0.6% of Tajik respondents and 1.9% of 
Uzbek respondents defined the influence of Russia as bad 
or rather bad.   
8 For a brief overview of various opinions held by Central 
Asian political experts with regard to Chinese expansion 
see Kitaiskaya ekspansiya v Srednuyu Aziyu: igra na 
operezhenie. Mnenie ekspertov 
(http://pda.regnum.ru/news/issues/866290.html).  
counterproductive. The latest SCO military exercise 
‘Peaceful Mission 2007’ used the scenario of the 
Andijan events and joint forces were trained to 
suppress an uprising.
9 It implies that Central Asian 
authoritarian governments can expect external 
support in case of a serious dissent by some of their 
citizens. At present, it is hard to imagine Russian or 
Chinese soldiers engaged in military actions in 
Central Asia. However if this happens, a flare-up of 
anti-Russian and anti-Chinese sentiments can be 
expected which might result in the destabilisation of 
Central Asia. The suppression can also lead to 
further radicalisation of dissenting factions, which is 
not beneficial for the security of the region.  
The extent to which the US can deploy international 
and national support for maintaining and 
strengthening the sovereignty of the Central Asian 
countries make it a very attractive partner for 
Central Asian states. However, the US is far away 
and its policies and level of engagement in the 
region are determined by the general considerations 
of Eurasian geopolitics, and are therefore subject to 
change. The emerging rivalry between the US and 
the leading neighbours of Central Asian – Russia 
and China – suggest that deeper cooperation 
between the states of the region and Washington 
could lead to increased tensions in the region.  
Unlike the US, the EU has long-term interests in 
Central Asia for it is directly affected by the 
developments in the region. It has the resources and, 
as the new strategy indicates, the intention to engage 
seriously in Central Asia. It wants to contribute to 
the transformation of the region into a secure and 
well-governed area, which is in the best interests of 
Central Asians as well, and it can offer models of 
political development and good governance and 
patterns of cooperation that can be emulated to 
achieve this goal. It can provide an alternative 
gravitation pole for Central Asia, creating real 
opportunities for security and sustainable 
development.  What has been lacking so far is a 
coherent European policy based on clearly defined 
interests and guided by realistic but ambitious goals 
in the region. The strategy is the first attempt to find 
this policy. Deeper partnership between the EU and 
Central Asia will be mutually beneficial. It remains 
to be seen whether the EU can master the political 
will to shape and carry out its agenda in the region.  
Democratisation, rule of law and human 
rights 
The EU Strategy contains a commitment to the 
promotion of the rule of law in Central Asia, rightly 
                                                 
9 “Rossiya vypisla povestku SHOS”, Kommersant, No. 
146, 16 August, 2007.  
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claiming that it is the basis of political and 
economic development. It is planning to support 
legal and judicial reforms, share experiences and 
best practices, train local experts, organise and 
sponsor specialised conferences, etc. However, it is 
clear that no real legal and judicial reforms can take 
place in the absence of political reforms. The 
judicial sector is not independent and is subject to 
corruption to the same degree as the rest of the 
political system. Sharing experiences and organising 
training sessions are very unlikely to have any 
impact beyond minor cosmetic improvements. On 
the other hand, training young people who have yet 
to enter the system might be more productive.  
Good governance, rule of law and compliance with 
human rights are impossible without 
democratisation and the introduction of proper 
mechanisms of checks and balances. The EU cannot 
democratise Central Asia, but it can continue 
pushing for the enhancement of the political space 
and greater political pluralism. The pressure of 
European countries and organisations has been the 
great support and often the factor of survival of pro-
democracy forces in the region. As a result, Europe 
has become the most important ‘reference group’ for 
Central Asian representatives of civil society, 
political opposition and their supporters.   
The ‘sticks’ Europe has in the region are not big, but 
not they should be underestimated. Central Asian 
political elites do not want to be left to the mercy of 
Russia and China; they also need Western 
investments and technologies, factors that account 
for the persistence of the ‘multi-vector’ foreign 
policies of Central Asian states. It is important that 
they do not acquire the impression that European 
states and organisations can be blackmailed or 
bribed (which would fit into their worldview better). 
It is vital for Central Asia that Europe does not give 
up on the region and can summon up the necessary 
patience and strength to ensure its transformation 
into a ‘peaceful, democratic and prosperous’ area.  
Developing energy and transportation 
links  
Discussing energy and transportation links, the 
strategy dwells on the Caspian Sea - Black Sea - EU 
energy transport corridor. If it is built, Europe will 
acquire an alternative source of oil and gas supplies, 
and Central Asian states will receive access to 
lucrative markets and become less vulnerable to 
Russian pressure. The project is mutually beneficial, 
however, as already mentioned, it faces considerable 
constraints. The EU pipeline aspires to connect 
Caspian resources with European markets, such as 
Nabucco, and the trans-Caspian pipeline is meeting 
strong resistance, for Russia does not want to lose 
its monopoly control over Central Asian gas. 
Considering the leverage Moscow has with regard 
to Central Asia, European countries and European 
companies, it can be argued that the development of 
Caspian resources and their transportation directly 
to Europe cannot be implemented without a certain 
accommodation of Russian interests and the 
participation of Russian companies in the deals.  
Obviously, this is not an easy task. However, 
Europe has a number of strong cards to play. Firstly, 
without European and generally Western 
participation, it will be impossible to develop the 
Turkmen gas fields that are to provide the future gas 
for export. Secondly, Russia is unlikely to ratify the 
European Energy Charter, but it would need a legal 
framework for the protection of its pipelines from 
transit risks.
10 The EU can negotiate such a 
framework keeping in mind the desired access to 
Central Asian resources. Overall it would be more 
profitable for Russia and Europe to have a more 
cooperative framework that would allow choosing 
more economically viable pipeline routes over 
expensive geopolitics-driven ones.  
Apart from oil and gas, the Strategy touches upon 
the development of hydro-power and its distribution 
in the region of Central Asia. It deems the 
development of this energy resource crucial to 
promoting stability and prosperity in Central Asia 
and beyond, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. It 
does not make it clear, however, whether the EU 
supports the increase of links between Central Asia 
and South Asia via Afghanistan beyond the water 
and hydropower sector, in effect supporting the 
integration projects currently promoted by the US 
and development institutes and often known as the 
‘Greater Central Asia Partnership’.
11  
Such an integration project constitutes a very 
important issue for Central Asia.  On the one hand, 
the project promises benefits to the landlocked 
Central Asian states, especially to impoverished 
Tajikistan, by creating opportunities for it to be 
integrated in the world economy. On the other hand, 
the risks of such an opening of the region to the 
highly unstable southern neighbourhood are so 
significant that they can easily overweigh any 
potential benefits. Drug trafficking, Islamic 
extremism are among the threats that Central Asian 
government believe will be aggravated, and the 
                                                 
10 V. Milov (2007), “Energodilaog Rossiya-ES; zapolnit 
vacuum” (Energy Dialogue Russia-EU: To Fill the 
Vacuum), Rossiya v globalnoi politike, No. 5, Sept-Oct 
(http://www.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/28/8546.html). 
11 S. Frederick Starr (2005), A Greater Central Asia 
Partnership for Afghanistan and Central Asia, Silk Road 
Paper, March 
(http://www.silkroadstudies.org/CACI/Strategy.pdf).  
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already-fragile security of the weak Central Asian 
states, which are only separated from each other by 
porous borders, might be completely undermined. 
Since there is a connection between Central Asian 
and European security (notably in the areas of drug 
trafficking, weapons and WMD smuggling, 
international terrorism and the spread of 
pandemics), Europe will be affected too.  
Regional experts tend to be very negative about the 
‘Central Asian Partnership’ project. Kazakh scholar 
Murat Laumulin stated that “the merger of Central 
Asia with archaic Afghanistan can change the 
European vector in the development of Central Asia 
and Kazakhstan, that is interrupt the process of 
modernisation, which by fits and starts has been 
going on for many decades.”
12 In the opinion of his 
Kyrgyz colleague Alexander Knyazev, “any 
liberalisation of a border regime with a country 
producing 90% of the world’s opium and heroin and 
that remains a haven for extremists and terrorist 
organisations, would turn the whole region into a 
huge Afghanistan”.
13 Thus, there are fears that 
pushing Central Asia in the southern direction 
would undermine the achievements of the Soviet 
modernisation project and distance it from Europe.   
The special case of Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan is often singled out by European policy-
makers and experts as the most promising partner 
for cooperation. It owes its favourable status to its 
rapid level of economic development, certain 
freedoms permitted by the relatively benign 
authoritarian regime, and very importantly some 
freedom of geopolitical manoeuvre that the country 
can afford due to its strengths.  
The Western vector of Kazakh foreign policy has 
always been strong. Its European orientation was 
driven both by the practical reasons mentioned 
above and also by the sense that the country is a part 
of Eurasia and, therefore, has a European identity 
(since part of the territory of the country is 
geographically in the European part of the 
continent). President Nazarbayev from time to time 
stresses that Kazakhstanis are Europeans.
14 The 
                                                 
12 M. Laumulin (2005), “Bolshaya tsentralnaya Aziya – 
novyi megaproekt SShA.?” (Greater Central Asia – A 
new US mega-project?), Kontinent No. 22 (158), pp.16-
29, November.  
13 A. Knyazev (2007), “Bolshaya Tsentralnaya Aziya – 
eto vpolne ochevidnyi geopoliticheskii marazm” (Greater 
Central Asia is an obvious geopolitical insanity), 
interview given to Ferghana-ru information agency on 5 
July (http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=5214).  
14 BBC (2006), “Nazarbayev: kazakhi – evropeitsy, a ne 
aziaty” (Nazarbayev: Kazakhs are Europeans and not 
successful bid made by Kazakhstan for the 
chairmanship of the OSCE indicates that the 
political elites of Kazakhstan view the country as 
part of the European space, where they want to play 
a more active role.  
The political opposition in Kazakhstan is even more 
strongly pro-European oriented. The programme of 
the single opposition presidential candidate in 2006 
was entitled “By way of justice – toward a dignified 
life!” (A Democratic Civilisational Alternative), and 
promoted the European orientation of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy.
15 It stated that the survival and 
strengthening of the young nation-state of 
Kazakhstan is possible if it makes the right choice in 
terms of civilisational affinity and if it makes a 
conscious decision to deepen ties with Europe.  
It is a telling detail that when the US State 
Department reorganised and moved the Central 
Asian states from the Eurasian Bureau to the newly 
created South and Central Asia Bureau in 2006,  
Kazakh political elites were particularly perturbed. 
No Kazakhstani expert assessed this move 
positively, while, for example, a Tajik expert Rashid 
Abdullo evaluated the new grouping as more 
reasonable.
16 The sense of separateness that 
Kazakhstanis have with regard to the rest of Central 
Asia can be traced to the Soviet times when the 
region was referred to as Kazakhstan and Middle 
Asia (Kazakhstan I Srednyaya Aziya).  
The EU can draw on these Kazakhstani perceptions 
and stress the integration possibilities. It is clear that 
Kazakhstan cannot be offered membership, but it 
can aspire to be part of the European neighbourhood 
programme at some point in the future and to 
participate in elements of the programme on an ad 
hoc basis. Unlike Russia, Kazakhstan will have no 
psychological difficulties in becoming a junior 
partner of the EU.  
Although Kazakhstani political elites are attracted to 
Europe, they are held back by the political legacy 
they have accumulated (corruption, repressive 
policies, lack of meaningful political reforms). They 
would not want to become pariahs in the West, 
however The Kazakh leadership draws a 
                                                                               
Asians), interview given to BBC, 28 September. 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/international/newsid_53
86000/5386272.stm htm). 
15 Programma predvybornogo kandidata Zharmakhana 
Tuyakbaya ‘Putem spravedlivosti – k dostoinoi zhizni! 
(demokraticheskaya tsivilizatsionnaya alternativa)’ 
(http://www.akzholparty.kz/action.php?go=content&set=
showpage&pid=515). 
16 Rashid Abdullo (2007), “US Policy in Tajikistan: From 
Recognition of Its Independence to Partnership”, Central 
Asia and the Caucasus, No. 4 (46).  
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considerable portion of its pride and legitimacy 
from the relatively positive image it enjoys in the 
West, and that is why it does not hesitate to spend a 
lot of money on PR campaigns targeted at Western 
audiences and it makes the effort of imitating 
democratic processes.
17  
At present, Kazakhstan is entering a systemic 
political crisis. The country cannot further develop 
in the current institutional framework. Besides, if 
until now, the growing economy served as a cushion 
for the regime, the major problems experienced in 
the banking and construction sectors (two pillars of 
the national economy) in 2007 have challenged the 
‘euphoria of success’ of recent years and have made 
the system more vulnerable. Difficult years lie 
ahead, and a lot will depend on whether Kazakhstan 
has accumulated sufficient potential in institutional 
consolidation and economic development to help the 
young nation-state get through this crisis.  
Therefore, it is premature to expect Kazakhstan to 
play the role of locomotive for regional integration. 
It is not yet ready. Also importantly, other Central 
Asian states are not ready for Astana to lead a 
process of integration for a variety of reasons, the 
most important being that they are all authoritarian 
states. The main priority in Kazakhstan today is to 
establish the conditions for institutional change and 
political reforms. The EU can make a considerable 
contribution to this aim through the use of its ‘soft 
power’, which can prove effective if the EU policy 
is clear, consistent and supported by greater 
engagement.    
Recommendations for the EU 
1.  It is important to clarify the EU interests in 
the region against the background of other 
external actors’ interests, particularly those 
of Russia, China and the US.  In the areas 
where the interests overlap, cooperation 
projects can be pursued. In cases where they 
differ, the EU should steadfastly pursue its 
own agenda. 
2.  The EU policies aimed at the promotion of 
good governance, democratisation, rule of 
law and human rights in the region of 
Central Asia are extremely important. 
Central Asian states are located in an 
authoritarian neighbourhood. The EU and 
the values it embodies create an alternative 
gravitational pole for Central Asian 
                                                 
17 Nikola Krastev (2006), “Kazakhstan: Long Delays Sap 
Strength from ‘Kazakhgate’ Case”, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), 29 September 
(http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/09/30c0e4ca-
9f32-4cf3-b7e8-862ff58214f8.html).  
societies that have been undergoing a 
serious transformation since the collapse of 
the USSR. The EU cannot democratise 
Central Asia, but it can continue pushing for 
the enhancement of the political space and 
greater political pluralism in the region. If it 
is done gently but consistently if the right 
incentives are offered, the Central Asian 
authorities would come to the conclusion 
that the EU can not be bought off or easily 
pacified. As for the Rule of Law initiative, 
only very small progress can be expected 
under the current political regimes. The 
most productive way seems to be through 
the education of young people.  
3.  It is of great importance both for the EU and 
the Central Asian states to build a transport 
corridor to connect Caspian resources with 
European markets. The success of the 
enterprise will be in doubt, however, unless 
some kind of cooperative framework is 
developed with Russia. If the EU can 
develop such a framework, this will be 
beneficial for all parties involved. 
4.  The ongoing process of integrating Central 
Asia with Afghanistan, as is being promoted 
by the US, can have very serious 
consequences for the security of the region 
and push back rather than advance its 
development. The EU should make a 
thorough analysis of the situation and with 
the aim of identifying possible risks of such 
integration for Central Asia and for 
European security.  
5.  Taking into account the pro-European 
sentiments in Kazakhstan and given the 
country’s advanced economic development, 
it offers itself as among the most promising 
in the region not only for cooperation with 
the EU, but also as a possible candidate for 
the European Neighbourhood Policy. Such a 
reconfiguration of the Eurasian geopolitical 
space would be extremely beneficial for the 
region of Central Asia at large.  
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